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The Visible Hand and the New American Biology: Toward an Integrated
Historiography of Railroad-Supported Agricultural Research

KEVIN S. AMIDON

In the early twentieth century, American railroad companies faced new challenges. The railroad
network had developed fully, broad political opposition was gaining teeth in new, enforceable
federal legislation, and financial markets-first established to support railroad expansion- had
begun to move beyond railroads. Railroad companies answered with a wide range of new
managerial and scientific practices. Recent scholarship that goes beyond the traditional
disciplinary separation of technological, political, managerial, economic, and scientific concerns
has enabled historians to recognize that agricultural research pursued in concert with other
institutions empowered railroads to address all of these challenges in the period between 1900
and 1930.

KEVIN S. AMIDON is associate professor of German Studies and a contributing member of
the faculty in History of Technology and Science at Iowa State University.

At the broadest level, participation in agricultural research brought railroads into the sphere of
the biological sciences, which at the turn of the twentieth century held out the promise of a
new and effective unity of knowledge production, political action, and economic productivity.
During the biological moment between 1900 and the Great Depression, railroad support of
agricultural research provided a means of linking abstract, basic investigational practices to
Progressive ideals of national wellbeing and of addressing perceived weaknesses in a branch of

the economy that provided much railroad traffic. The broad collaboration between railroads and
land-grant colleges in this period significantly concreted the institutional form of this concert of
interests. This linkage became sufficiently diffuse by the time of the Great Depression that the
biological moment in railroad practice had passed, and agricultural research lost its once
compelling allure for railroad managers. For a few short decades, however, the “visible hand” in
American railroad management was not only that of the accountant, the scientific manager, and
the engineer; it was the hand of the biologist as well.
In 1938 the management of the Illinois Central Railroad (IC) charged the railroad’s own
Research and Development Bureau with compiling a set of essays drawn from internal training
programs that could offer a systematic representation of the “Organization and Traffic of the

Illinois Central System.” The Bureau resonantly summarized its guiding principle: “Good
research moves someone to act.” Furthermore, research should follow “the method employed
by the natural scientist.” In economic terms it would be easy enough to imagine that the
company desired to maintain competitive advantage by keeping the benefits of its research
clearly within its own boundaries. Accordingly, the bureau set forth its program:
It should be borne in mind that there are two principal kinds of railroad research.
First, there is mechanical and chemical research which develops improvements in
equipment, materials, fabrics, paints and even such wonders as modern
streamlined trains. Second there is commercial or traffic research which develops
improvements in freight and passenger rates and service and studies natural
resources, population and industry to find a ready market for the best
transportation that can be produced.
Indeed, the benefits of the bureau’s work seemed to be limited to the firm itself. The chapter
concluded with this vision reduced to a cliché: “Our competitive position is also improved simply
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because knowledge is power.” It would therefore seem that the IC left the question of the
benefit of its research policies to entities not represented on the corporate balance sheet
exclusively in the care of Adam Smith’s invisible hand.1
The Association of American Railroads (AAR), the industry’s primary lobbying and public
relations group, shared such an internalist vision of railroad research practice when it chose
some ten years later to produce a pamphlet for dissemination to schools entitled The Railroad

Story: Science, Research, and Railroad Progress. The pamphlet’s metaphorical vision of science
as the source of all railroad technology and practice took form in a cover photomontage of a
two-hundred-forty-ton locomotive emerging fully formed and in builder’s-photograph matte
paint from a hand-held test tube (Figure 1). The pamphlet argued in several chapters that
“research brings steady improvements.” A second photomontage represented this vision by
surrounding both the face of “experimental” company-built Norfolk and Western Railway Class A
locomotive number 1200 and a serious, white-coated chemical researcher with vignettes of
railroad operations and management (Figure 2). Nonetheless, Smith’s hand was not so invisible
here, for the railroad industry’s trade group could not privilege the narrow interests of one firm
over another. The entire railroad industry was in play and the pamphlet encouraged readers to
perceive that railroad research benefits the public and the nation. “Science and many thousands
of people keep the railroads working constantly for us,” and, inexorably then, “railroads bring
modern progress,” so much so that “the railroads’ future is our future.” The AAR’s pamphlet,
however, notably failed entirely to mention a once-significant aspect of railroad-supported
research that directly focused railroad resources on practices external to the companies’ own
technical and managerial systems: agricultural research.2
<#1>
Figure 1
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The IC’s self-assessment also displayed complex issues of corporate, public, and
regional benefit associated with railroad support of agricultural research and development. The
chapter entitled “Agricultural Development” sat in close proximity to the chapter on the
practices of the Research and Development. The company’s choice to separate research from
development revealed the unstable position of agricultural research within the company’s
practices. In fact, the chapter on agricultural development never once included the term
“research,” although it described the IC’s energetic support--from the moment of its corporate
inception in 1850--for the investigation and propagation of better drainage, crop diversification,
farm machinery, fruit and vegetable varieties, refrigeration, dairying methods, agricultural
marketing, pest control, erosion control, seed oil varieties, and livestock husbandry.
Nonetheless, in 1938 the IC described these practices not as research, but only as
development.3
By the late 1930s railroad companies and their advocates understood “research” to refer
only to the improvement of the railroads’ own internal technical and managerial practices.
“Development,” on the other hand, represented inquiry into practices beyond those of the firm
itself that might lead to the improvement of their traffic base. Nonetheless, a survey of the
literature on railroad research and development revealed that such an interpretation failed to
account for the diversity of practices through which railroad companies supported agricultural
research in the earlier part of the twentieth century. [Between the turn of the century and the
Great Depression (punctuated by the US Railroad Administration federalization during the First
World War), the representatives of almost all larger American railroad companies, with the
exception of the major Eastern trunk lines, saw agricultural research as an integral element in
their strategies of corporate growth, public and government relations, and capital restructuring
[KA: Please provide a citation for this]. Such research expanded railroad practice in ways
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that appeared to benefit both the corporations and their broader constituencies, it provided a
means of addressing the political pressures brought to bear on railroads, and it held the
potential to demonstrate to the capital markets, which were emerging from their formative
period of railroad dominance, that railroads offered good opportunities for returns.4
<#2>
Figure 2
The IC, in fact, provided the records and materials that enabled a number of pathbreaking scholars to first establish the historical significance of railroad-supported agricultural
research. The two most important such studies are Paul Wallace Gates’s The Illinois Central

Railroad and Its Colonization Work, itself an important source for the railroad’s 1938 self-study,
and the only attempt at a comprehensive treatment of railroad agricultural “development,” Roy
V. Scott’s Railroad Development Programs in the Twentieth Century. Several recent major
studies from a range of historical subfields on business culture, railroad politics and practice,
and agricultural practice--each of which addresses in some depth the workings of a single
railroad company--have now revealed sufficient details about railroad companies’ interest in
agricultural research to enable the development of an integrated historiographical approach to
the issue’s many complexities. These studies include Olivier Zunz’s Making America Corporate,

1870=-1920, Gerald Berk’s Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of the American Industrial
Order, 1865=-1917, Steven Usselman’s Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology,
and Politics in America, 1840=-1920, Claire Strom’s Profiting from the Plains: The Great
Northern Railway and Corporate Development of the American West, Deborah Fitzgerald’s Every
Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture, and Richard Orsi’s Sunset Limited:
The Southern Pacific Railroad and the Development of the American West, 1850=-1930.5

5

Around 1900 and after, railroads and farmers entered together into the spheres of
investigation and persuasion associated with a rapidly and powerfully expanding field of
science: biology. Both farmers and scientists showed some resistance to this shift, but by the
early twentieth century, biologists--a highly diverse group with fluid disciplinary identifications-had accepted that agricultural research was biological in character. The historiography of
biology, and especially American biology after 1890, also focused on a significant shift in
practice that correlated with the new investigational interests that railroads held in agriculture:
the rise of experimental methods. For most of the nineteenth century, historical, anatomical,
and morphological evidence--none of it derived from experimental observation under controlled
conditions--had dominated biology. The late nineteenth century, however, witnessed the rise of
investigational techniques that could relate conceptual phenomena like hereditary transmission
to specific physiological processes in cells and organs.6
American biologists made this shift to experimental methods such a significant element
of their practices around 1900 that many historians have accepted Garland Allen’s suggestion
that the shift represents a “New American Biology.” Some biologists argued that sophisticated
experimental practice meant that biology had finally become an autonomous science,
independent of interests or investments in political, social, or cultural issues. Far more
biologists, however, recognized that the exciting new results provided by experimentation could
provide the basis for an invigorated kind of advocacy that made biology the basis for claims
about the social, political, and moral good. Biology quickly became rooted in support of
discourses of progress in scientific knowledge, political organization, and social advocacy. The
classical Progressive “search for order” emerged wherever this network of scientific
investigation and social and political valences of persuasion encountered the technical practices
of institutions like the railroad.7
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The search for order in agriculture in the early twentieth century therefore became
biological in three ways. At the simplest level, research on crop varieties was increasingly
subject to controlled and institutionalized experimental processes after 1900, which interested
and scientifically inclined farmers could pursue. Nonetheless, the professionalization of crop
improvement meant that agricultural inputs like hybrid seeds increasingly came not from
farmers themselves, but from research pursued in land-grant colleges, government experiment
stations, and specialized industrial corporations. Thus, agricultural processes predicated on
biological knowledge supported the development of a capital-intensive new industry. Finally,
this new and contentious complex of farming and capital accreted a wide set of claims about
social good and political rationalization. In the early twentieth century, all of these discourses
fell within the sphere of biological knowledge: the specific attributes of crop plants, the
development of industrial-scale hybridization with its attendant production and distribution
processes, and arguments about the social benefit of scientifically derived products. Railroad
companies all over the United States rapidly came to understand that they could benefit from all
of these. Improved crops translated into better harvests to deliver to faraway markets.
Increasing capital intensity in agriculture meant that railroads had the opportunity to not only
haul the products of agricultural production, but its inputs as well. They were therefore able to
link themselves to new industrial spaces of capital investment at a time when the financial
markets began to look beyond railroads for returns. Finally, railroads could counter political
criticism of their treatment of their agricultural constituents by connecting themselves to
biologically marked discourses of social improvement.8
After 1900 the expansion of the scale of the railroad network gave way to a new focus
on scope: effective management, capacity improvement, and regulation of existing
infrastructure. This brought a shift within railroads’ investigational goals from engineering, with
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its dominance of the technical, to science, which could be tied much more clearly both to
management and to questions of investigation and persuasion that had impact outside the
business firm itself. Experimentally structured investigation of agricultural processes was the
most important sphere of science to which railroads turned in their attempts to expand the
scope of their practices and persuasive claims. Some companies developed their own means of
funding experimental farms and propagating the results of their research in order to generate
traffic and positive public relations. Many more companies, however, linked their research
efforts directly to a relatively new set of institutions charged by law with disseminating
improvement in agricultural practices: land-grant colleges and agricultural experiment stations.9
<#3>
Figure 3
The complex relationships between railroads and the constituencies with whom they
were in positions of mutual dependence in the early twentieth century have made it exceedingly
difficult for scholars to approach railroad practice with an integrated vision. Maury Klein, for
example, has stated that “railroad history has never had a clear central theme or overview for
new information and insights to demolish.” Nonetheless, scholars seeking thorough readings of
the effects of railroad technology and practice have helped to define entire subfields of
American history. The relationships between railroads and their agricultural constituencies
undoubtedly rank among the most difficult to narrate with coherence. There is no shortage of
scholarly and popular historical literature on railroad exploitation of farmers, nor about railroads
as engines of regional growth and development. James Vance’s effusive language in the
introductory chapter to his economic geography of North American railroads expresses both the
significance of the railroad-agriculture relationship and the historian’s difficulty in representing
that significance with adequate precision:
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the world’s most effulgent agricultural region grew up “on the railroad,”
stretching uninterrupted from the backslope of the Appalachians in Québec,
Vermont, and upstate New York to the edge of the Great North at Fort Vermillion
. . . and to the Great West in the Rockies at the spine of the continent. This
simultaneous shaping of the world’s most extensive integrated railroad system . .
. and its greatest of all agricultural realms shows most conclusively that the
North American railroad served as the instrument of geographical development
of a previously inconceivable scale.
However, there exists no recent general study of opposition to railroads and their practices
among agricultural constituencies. Most of the literature on these issues found its documents in
the political and legal arenas, where so many wronged parties on both sides of such debates
sought their recourse.10
The infinite variety of railroad activities evinced in interaction with agricultural interests
can best be conceptualized as three classes of practice: technical, investigational, and
persuasive. Such a practical analysis reveals that in the early twentieth century, at the time that
railroads supported agricultural research most widely, their character as technological systems
expanded outward from the internally oriented “engineering ideal” of the maximally efficient
and well-managed machine toward a scientific conception of investigation that could benefit
firms and their constituencies together in an ongoing process of change and improvement.
Railroads at the time are therefore best understood as networks of the mediation and
propagation of knowledge. Investigational practices reveal this knowledge, technical practices
apply it to the machinery and management of the railroad, and persuasive practices spread it
recursively both within and beyond railroad institutions into the spheres of politics and
finance.11
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From their earliest period of growth in the early and mid-nineteenth century, American
railroads had always balanced investigational, technical, and persuasive practices within their
own institutional structures. Investigation quickly made its utility obvious: from early
developments in scheduling to telegraphic dispatching and from innovations in locomotive
construction to new developments in accounting practices, the mounting complexity of railroad
construction and operations demanded new forms of knowledge production. Into the late
nineteenth century, however, this knowledge production was directed largely toward the
solution of specific problems of technical practice, and was therefore ad hoc and unsystematic,
even within individual firms. Usselman chooses a vivid metaphor to describe this situation, one
that focuses attention on investigational practice: “The early lines were essentially grand
experiments.” What his metaphor risks obscuring is that early railroad investigation did not
apply systematic experimentation on the model of scientific inquiry, but focused rather on
specific technical issues. Usselman nonetheless recognizes this when he dubs the pattern of
these practices “insider innovation,” which emphasizes that they were simply structured and
applied internally.12
By the late nineteenth century, however, railroad investigational practice began to grow
systematically and its methods expanded to incorporate patterns of scientific research, including
controlled experimentation and comparison. Zunz expresses this by arguing that the “tinkerers”
who pursued ad hoc innovation in technical practice during the nineteenth century in fact
cannot be seen separately from the professionalization of scientific investigation:
While the tinkerer and the scientist could heretofore coexist and largely ignore
each other, the institutional and technological changes of late-nineteenth-century
America made this mutual avoidance more and more difficult. Tinkering had to
compromise with science and continue under a larger cognitive scheme.
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Investigational practice on the scientific model had a difficulty, however, one common to all
private firms including railroads: as the knowledge derived from investigation came uncoupled
from specific technical challenges internal to the firm, its benefits might no longer be easily
limited to the firm itself. The profits that the firm might hope to achieve from its investigational
results would be based on knowledge that other firms could easily exploit if they had access to
it. Railroad research thus developed in two directions--technical and agricultural--both of which
addressed the problem of benefit to entities external to the firm. Both forms also allowed
railroad companies to develop partnerships with other institutions, including locomotive
builders, engineering firms, and universities. These partnerships allowed the railroad companies
to spread both the risk and the expense of investigational practice, and to benefit individually
and collectively as an industry.13
The first of these investigational directions remained closely linked to technical practice,
and focused on experimental investigation into the physics and chemistry of the materials and
machines central to railroad operations. Major railroads with substantial cash flow and access to
capital occasionally chose to develop internal institutions dedicated to technical research. The
Pennsylvania Railroad’s (PRR) research, experimentation, and testing facilities attached to its
Juniata Shops complex in Altoona, Pennsylvania, represent the most extensive such attempt.
Usselman’s study of the practices pursued by the PRR and the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy
(CB&Q) reveals that they emerged ad hoc from particular requirements of technical practice. A
few major railroads with powerful and persuasive superintendents of motive power
experimented with locomotive and boiler design in their own internal shop facilities. Private
locomotive builders and equipment firms also explored the development of experimental
methods. Like the managers of the IC in 1938, historians of business and technology have
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generally limited their understanding of the forms of research pursued by railroad companies
and their supplier firms to this variety of technically driven investigation.14
The other major form of investigational practice pursued by railroad companies--the
promotion of experimental approaches to the improvement of agricultural products and
practices--brought railroad companies into much closer contact and conflict with their
constituents, and is therefore potentially both more difficult and more rewarding to explore than
technically derived research. The potential of the railroads’ encounter with biology through
agricultural research went well beyond traffic development, support for shippers, and public
relations. It provided the firms with a response to two dynamic moments in early twentiethcentury America: [the political pressure brought effectively to bear on large firms by
Progressive elites and the economic pressures of railroads’ loss of their position as the
constitutive and dominant element in American (and even international) financial markets [KA:
Please provide a citation for this].15
Historians have already widely explored the political aspects of these pressures on
railroads. However, the relationship between politics and investigational practice is much less
clear. Usselman relates them successfully to change in technically oriented investigational
practice. He argues that after 1900, the “engineering ideal” that had come to dominate railroad
management and technical practice in the later nineteenth century was turned against the
railroads by partisans of regulation like Louis D. Brandeis, who accused the companies of failing
to apply the new techniques of “scientific management.” The extensive work done by business
historians on managerial innovation and corporate structure also addresses these political
moments. Alfred Chandler’s narrative emphasizes that railroads instantiated a trajectory of
innovation in managerial technique and technology that spanned the period between 1850 and
1900. Nonetheless, their innovations insufficiently prepared them for the political and economic

12

challenges of the new century. “The railroad was . . . in every way the pioneer in modern
business administration,” Chandler insists, though he emphasizes that “as the new century
opened, patterns of success and failure were only just beginning to appear.”16
Economic developments, which left railroads contemplating the loss of their leading
position in the financial markets that had grown up through the nineteenth century to serve
them, complicated the pursuit of knowledge through investigational practice. While there is little
evidence to suggest that railroad executives and managers themselves perceived of any greater
difficulty in raising capital (at least between the economic recovery of the late 1890s and the
Panic of 1907), actors in American financial markets increasingly sought to diversify their
activities beyond the railroad sphere. In 1932 Winthrop M. Daniels, a former member of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and Culyer Professor of Transportation at Yale, reflected
upon railroads’ dominance of financial markets into the early twentieth century: “As late as
1906, almost eighty-five per cent of the bonds, and fully half of the stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, were those of railroad companies.” The situation was already changing,
though. With a range of evidence from both railroads and early integrated industrial firms,
Chandler reveals how financial and industrial actors grew aware of the increasing diversification
of the financial markets while they remained convinced of the central position of railroads in
both financial and managerial innovation.17
Caught between political and economic pressures, railroads could no longer turn only to
internal engineering solutions and their attendant rhetoric of efficiency. Albro Martin’s claim that
the Panic of 1907 “revealed the inadequacy of America’s economic institutions and of its
understanding of the forces that were at work” provides perhaps the most appropriate heuristic
marker of the beginnings of the movement of capital away from railroads. Railroad interests
had to respond persuasively to a new form of opposition. They had long faced arguments that
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their leaders were not interested in the wellbeing of their customers and constituents, but
rather only in the manipulation of securities for personal gain. Increasingly, however, they faced
skepticism from the very financial markets and leaders who had always been seen as
subservient to them. The rapid changes in regulatory structures in the first two decades of the
twentieth century, most significantly represented in the establishment of the Interstate
Commerce Commission’s power to set maximum freight rates without court confirmation
through the Hepburn Act of 1906, further complicated the railroads’ calculations of their
interests. Where agriculture formed a primary focus of railroad interest and source of traffic-that is almost everywhere outside the corporate suites of the major Eastern trunk lines-agricultural research constituted their most important answer.18
Independent of direct railroad support, investigational practice marked as agricultural
science brought vast changes to American agricultural life after 1870. Scott’s study of railroad
agricultural development work supports this trajectory of change in institutional practices. He
argues that railroad support of development--a category in which he includes research, but also
broader aspects of land use and settlement--“tended to be opportunistic and sporadic” before
1900. Such work was often either a response to local interests or a result of the personal
preferences of powerful individuals. In the 1870s and 1880s, at the same time that railroads
were reaping the greatest benefits from federal railroad land-grant policies, agricultural
scientists began to garner widespread state and federal government support for their work. This
support took two forms: first the expansion of federal land-grant policies to benefit state
colleges of agriculture and mechanic arts following the Morrill Act of 1862, and then direct
federal subsidy of agricultural experiment stations following the Hatch Act of 1887. Alan Marcus
summarizes these arguments in his study of agricultural experimentation in the late nineteenth
century: “promoters reminded their audiences that each farmer operated a laboratory, his farm,
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and suggested that all could devote a small portion of their efforts to experimental farming.”
Marcus further describes how “scientific farmers” and “agricultural scientists” often disagreed
because of the varying sources of their personal and institutional commitments--for farmers
these were technical and economic concerns and for the professional scientist they were
investigational and philosophical--but that both groups sought a “union of science and farming.”
Both farmers and scientists also perceived and responded to the economic pressures of
investment in agriculture by capital interests pursuing profit. The Hatch Act did not resolve such
conflicts among agricultural interest groups about the proper scope and setting of
experimentation, but it gave agricultural experiment stations the imprimatur of direct federal
funding, and thereby accelerated the propagation of investigational practice in agriculture
through professionalization.19
Marcus’s conclusion reveals a further moment of significance within the developing
concert of interests between agricultural science and railroads: he emphasizes that the Office of
Experiment Stations within the new USDA “adopted a managerial spirit, seeking to systematize
American agricultural science.” Thus, between 1900 and the Great Depression, professional
scientific investigators interested in agriculture met professionalized railroad managers in a new
symbiosis. Railroads across the country--from the Long Island Rail Road to the Southern Pacific
in California and from the Northern Pacific to the Central of Georgia--pursued a double-pronged
policy of collaboration with professional agricultural scientists from land-grant colleges,
experiment stations, and state extension programs. Railroad companies both supported the
work of academic investigators with resources like demonstration trains and also set up their
own experimental and demonstration farms, often staffed by graduates of the land-grant
colleges. Railroads exploited this merger of institutional research and corporate interests in
ways contingent upon local and regional economies, both to support the expansion of their
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business and to develop new arguments to defend their activity as serving the public, localities
and regions, and the nation as a whole. The high point of this symphony of interests and
conflicts came in the federal government’s passage of the Smith-Lever Act in 1914, which
established federal support for a nationwide system of county agricultural extension agents.
Revealingly, the act specifically forbade the use of federal extension monies for the support of
agricultural demonstration trains in order to prevent the appearance of a new form of federal
subsidy to railroad companies. Most railroads nonetheless strongly supported the act, because it
strengthened the expansion of the biological knowledge network that benefited both the firms
and their many constituents.20
In the early development of the American railroad network between 1830 and 1850, the
commercial interests of growing urban centers determined the economic geography of railroad
growth. Agriculture was important to railroad strategy, politics, and operations only as one of
many potential sources of business that could be efficiently gathered and transported into
urban centers by rail. By 1860, however, and with accelerating though intermittent vigor
throughout the later nineteenth century, railroads were growing outward beyond urban centers
into sparsely populated and developed regions all over the continent. As Scott has argued,
railroads therefore began in that period to explore agricultural innovation as a means of
expanding their traffic base. It was not until around 1900, though, that the rise of experimental
methods in biology, the changes in the structure of American financial markets, the
establishment of agricultural science in land-grant colleges, and the political atmosphere of the
Progressive Era precipitated the concert of interests that made the first three decades of the
twentieth century the biological era in railroad research policy.21
Individual railroad companies developed a range of responses to these many factors.
Across the agricultural Midwest and West, and with some examples in the Northeast and the
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South, companies and their leadership perceived that agricultural research could potentially
provide an integrated set of answers to the economic, financial, and political challenges of the
new century. Seven companies whose archival and documentary materials have been mined
recently [KA: Please provide a citation for these] by scholars of business, agricultural, and
technological history demonstrate the significance of these developments. They are the Illinois
Central (IC); the Southern Pacific (SP); the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy (CB&Q); the Great
Northern (GN]); the Northern Pacific (NP); the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western (DL&W);
and the Chicago Great Western (CGW).22
This list of railroad companies--with the exception of the last two, which are the
smallest, regionally based firms, and also the least thoroughly researched--will immediately
raise the question of the significance of managerial leadership in corporate policy toward
research. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the IC and the SP were closely associated
with the leadership of Edward Harriman; the CB&Q, NP, and GN were the three railroads linked
to James J. Hill. It is therefore tempting to seek a potentially simplest explanation of the
biological moment in railroad agricultural research primarily in the personal preferences of such
powerful executives. Indeed, both Harriman and Hill showed themselves to be personally
interested in agricultural (Hill) and biological (Harriman) research in the first decade of the
century. Furthermore, much historical work on railroad executives emphasizes what Chandler
calls the “truncated” qualities of their management structure: that railroad companies, because
of their quasi-monopolistic position in transportation around 1900, could be managed in an
almost exclusively top-down fashion by powerful executives. Nonetheless, an evaluation of the
significance of these seven representative firms gives support to Zunz’s contention that railroad
companies, like other technologically sophisticated large firms of the day, were not simply
fiefdoms of their great leading figures. Rather, they were dynamic entities with growing
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knowledge-based structures that linked center and periphery, the local and the regional, the
executive in the metropolis with the operating and managerial staff at the far reaches of the
system. For the many railroad companies with large agricultural traffic bases around and after
1900, agricultural research made sense from the perspective of all of the nodes of this
knowledge network. Not only could it represent the railroads’ interest in the wellbeing of their
constituent shippers and customers, but it could serve the interests of all of the members of the
growing managerial bureaucracy.23
The Illinois Central Railroad has provided a substantial fraction of the archival and
documentary material available to scholars of railroad innovation in management, technology
and agriculture. The company’s long history of financial strength, managerial innovation (not
always successful or systematic), and interest in local traffic development, together with its
participation in a diverse range of regional economies in the industrial and agricultural Midwest
and Mid-South, make it perhaps the best representative of the railroad as knowledge network in
the early twentieth century. The roots of the IC’s extensive and differentiated support of
agricultural research reach well back into the nineteenth century. John F. Stover’s history of the
IC and the company’s own 1938 self-study pursue this point. Nonetheless Stover’s narrative
also clearly evinces a shift in the scope of the IC’s investigational practice after 1900: “After
1900 there had been a definite increase in agricultural promotion throughout all sections of the
country served by the railroad.” The IC was also closely involved in the development and
success of the University of Illinois at Champaign, one of the earliest of the land-grant colleges
that would form the centers of much agricultural science. It also worked with the Extension
Department of the Louisiana State University and with Professor P. G. Holden of the Iowa State
College. No other single railroad provides more evidence in Scott’s analysis of railroad
development programs. Though he recognizes that the IC did not necessarily originate all of the
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many research and development programs that it pursued, its policies promoting the
colonization of land grants, the propagation of new and improved crops, and even innovations
like better wagon road surfaces and coal prospecting techniques were “so successful that they
were subsequently adopted by other roads.”24
<#4>
Figure 4
The presence in the IC’s knowledge network both of very powerful executive figures and
of a longstanding policy of regional differentiation in support of research and development
means that it was in fact a difficult example through which to demonstrate the set of financial,
political, and scientific factors that precipitated the biological moment in railroad research after
1900. Stover’s exhaustive narrative history, however, provides evidence sufficient to tease these
factors out of the dominant story of executive entrepreneurship. The IC was indeed an
extraordinarily financially secure firm at the turn of the twentieth century, and this gave it the
opportunity to pursue the systematic improvements in technical standards with which Harriman
is so closely associated. One specific choice by the company’s management, however, reveals
that it valued highly the potentially intangible benefits to be gained from corporate association
with the vision of a scientifically ordered society. The IC provided not only substantial financial
and logistical support, but also major organizational talent for the 1893 World’s Columbian
Exposition in Chicago. The IC maintained its vigorous interest in agricultural research through
the 1920s. Despite the fact that agricultural products as a fraction of the firm’s traffic revenue
had fallen from almost one-half in the 1890s to only one-sixth in the 1920s, the company and
its executives never wavered in their ongoing, regionally differentiated policy of support for
agricultural research and development. The severe retrenchment of the Great Depression put
an end to this policy, however.25
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The Southern Pacific Railroad, another corporation closely associated with E. H.
Harriman after 1901, pursued policies similar to those of the IC. Richard Orsi has recently
provided an extraordinarily thorough and perspicacious history of the company in its economic,
social, and political guises, a history in which the company’s varied investments and interests in
agricultural research, pursued vigorously in concert with land-grant colleges and even
independent agricultural researchers like Luther Burbank, play a central role. Orsi clearly
demonstrates the inadequacy of the traditional narrative of the SP-“Octopus” exploitation of
farmers and resistance to political interventions. His arguments also lend strong support to the
concept of the railroad as knowledge network:
Not only was the ostensible villain [the SP] providing expensive assistance to
farmers, a group whose welfare it was charged with ignoring, the company was
also engaged with western land-grant universities in promoting the modern ideal
of scientific efficiency, held by many historians to be a unifying principle of the
Progressive movement. . . [T]he story . . . suggests that the Southern Pacific
was not as hostile toward farmers’ interests and Progressivism itself as historians
have traditionally maintained. It also illustrates the ways in which railroad and
university were similar and inter-related types of organizations that shared
problems, values, relationships, and roles in the modernization of western
agriculture.
A particularly notable aspect of the SP’s investigational practices is that it pursued scientific
means of gathering information that affected company traffic and operations, including of
agricultural practices, crop and soil conditions, and weather patterns, and disseminated them
widely both within the firm and to outside constituents including farmers, shippers, and state
and federal government agencies. Another important moment in Orsi’s analysis purses the
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similar patterns of public opposition both to the SP and to the University of California despite
their extensive collaborative work in support of agricultural research and practice.26
The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, another firm with a particularly accessible
and well-preserved set of corporate archival records, provides a hybrid case. Constituent
interests driven by the traffic base led the company to support agricultural development, but
managerial policy favored varieties of investigational practice more narrowly targeted toward
internal benefit through the improvement of technical practice. Both Zunz and Usselman
extensively address the CB&Q’s policies in their work, but neither focuses on its agricultural
interests. Zunz sees the firm as “a representative case study of the making of a managerial
workforce,” and he uses this as a basis for his arguments that corporate change originated both
with executives and middle-level managers. He concludes from his CB&Q evidence that the new
managerial culture fashioned a differentiated understanding of the distribution of the benefits of
the firm’s activities from its new means of knowledge generation, for “managers invented a new
work culture within the larger corporations, a culture that balanced order and rule with
competition and a search for profits and that sought to resolve large problems with increasingly
specialized knowledge.” Usselman extensively explores the CB&Q’s leadership in the pursuit of
engineering solutions to a wide range of technical problems of operation including signaling, rail
metallurgy, and air brake technology. At the same time, however, Usselman points to ways in
which this “engineering ideal” could itself motivate the firm’s managers to support agricultural
science as a means of expanding the benefits of systematic investigation beyond the bounds of
the firm itself. And indeed the CB&Q participated vigorously in the biological moment. It had a
number of its own experimental farms beginning in the 1890s, published several freely
distributed periodicals on farming methods, and operated numerous agricultural education
trains as late as 1940 in concert with land-grant colleges and other institutions. In 1913 it
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opened its own Agricultural Department under the leadership of the University of Minnesota
agronomist John B. Lamson.27
The two great transcontinental railroads of the northern tier, the Northern Pacific
Railway and the Great Northern Railway (which were united but not merged through the
Northern Securities Company in 1901), display the most dramatic case of conflict between the
will of powerful executives (James J. Hill and his second son Louis, themselves personally
interested in scientific farming) and the goals of agricultural scientists affiliated with educational
and scientific institutions. Claire Strom emphasizes this point in her history of the GN’s
development policy and demonstrates how the contested field of financial and political interests
among railroads, railroad leaders, and their constituents meant that railroad policy could appear
both to serve and to undercut Progressive political goals. She argues that
[James J. Hill] concurred with the Progressive belief that agriculture needed to
be more scientific and businesslike, and he supported the need for experts to
establish fundamental agrarian principles. At the same time . . . he believed that
expertise could be established through means other than formal education.
Hill’s personal vision of himself as railroad executive and scientific farmer led to a string of
personal failures in his own farming ventures and to recurrent breakdowns in the relationships
between the GN and the government and university institutions with which it began
collaborative initiatives. Thus, “by 1916 university experts had clearly gained ascendancy.”
Deborah Fitzgerald’s work, which focuses on developments in Montana, complements Strom’s.
Her subtle analysis extends the vision of large-scale industry as knowledge network to the rise
of “industrial” agriculture in the 1920s and 1930s. While observing the contingency of local
developments, she argues that
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an agricultural leadership emerged in the 1920s--composed of business leaders,
government agents, agricultural college professors, demonstration agents, and
bankers--and . . . this leadership developed an industrial logic for agriculture.
This logic functioned as a matrix of ideas, practices, and relationships that
persuaded farmers to change the way they did things.
Unsurprisingly, she discovers that the GN and NP shared a “sudden enthusiasm” for highly
mechanized, industrial-scale wheat farming in Montana in the mid-1920s.28
The two remaining representative cases are smaller railroads that both responded to the
biological moment, but whose response was more limited. The first is the Delaware,
Lackawanna and Western Railroad, which linked the New York/New Jersey waterfront with
Buffalo via Scranton, Pennsylvania. The DL&W demonstrates that the biological moment was a
national phenomenon (though many other Eastern railroads including the Lehigh Valley, Erie,
Delaware and Hudson, New York Central, Baltimore and Ohio, and Pennsylvania also pursued
limited agricultural research in this period). More importantly, it shows that both the rise and
decline of the biological moment were contingent upon corporate financial performance, and
upon political and economic factors at the local level and beyond. Scott recounts a revealing
moment in 1910 and 1911 when the DL&W “approached the [New York] state department of
agriculture and the agricultural college at Cornell, offering to purchase two farms and turn them
over to the state for demonstration purposes.” This suggestion resulted not in new
demonstration farms, however, but in the DL&W’s support of a generous expansion of the
state’s county extension agent program. Nonetheless the railroad had specifically done so
“hoping to halt the decay in agriculture in southern New York State.” By the end of the decade,
however, the DL&W was spending its capital resources not on agricultural research, but on a
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huge rebuilding of its line in the mountains of New Jersey and Pennsylvania to facilitate highspeed through freight and coal traffic.29
The final case is the Chicago Great Western, a system that tied together Chicago,
Omaha, Kansas City, and Minneapolis through a hub at Oelwein, Iowa, and which existed
constantly in the shadow of several much larger competitors in all of its markets. Gerald Berk
uses the CGW as a case study in support of a large-scale attempt to reread American business
history in which he argues for a vision of “regional republicanism” rather than one of “corporate
capitalism.” Though Berk focuses on management practice and the concept of a “viable regional
carrier” rather than on research and development, he could not have chosen better evidence for
his thesis than the attempts by an undercapitalized railroad company dependent upon
agricultural traffic to link itself to the biological knowledge network of the early twentieth
century. He notes the CGW’s attempts to pursue technological innovations in locomotive design,
operation, and maintenance managed from its Oelwein shops complex, and also its experiments
around 1900 with a flat managerial structure in which local station agents reported directly to
the general superintendent in Oelwein. But he does not miss the agricultural analogue of these
practices, which meant that as early as the 1870s, the company was encouraging agricultural
diversification in local and regional markets. Bucking the trend away from railroad-employed
agricultural educators and agents after the passage of the Smith-Lever Act, in the 1920s the
CGW (like the DL&W, another railroad with strong regional interests) pursued a particularly
vigorous “personal service campaign,” which included both individualized assistance and group
meetings at which constituents were invited to address both agricultural and railroad service
issues.30
The cultural and political determinants of railroads’ turn to agricultural research after
1900 were always mediated through the not yet fully professionalized corporate leadership.
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Corporate strategies, therefore, still reflected the personalities and proclivities of leading figures
like the Harriman and Hill. The 1920s represented the last phase of strategic investment by
railroads in general research goals, and thereafter such investment was mostly limited to public
relations. During the biological moment between 1900 and the Great Depression, however,
railroad support of agricultural research provided a means of linking abstract, basic
investigational practices to Progressive ideals of national well-being, and of addressing
perceived weaknesses in a branch of the economy that provided much railroad traffic. The
broad collaboration between railroads and land-grant colleges in this period was the most
significant and concrete institutional form of this concert of interests. Much future research will
be needed to clarify the dynamics of this knowledge network, especially to enable clear links to
be drawn between the local and regional factors that drove railroad investment in agricultural
research and the larger-scale shifts in economic conditions and financial markets that motivated
the industry’s consolidation and its ongoing interest in engineering improvements. Nonetheless,
the biological moment left its mark both on railroad companies across the country and on the
agricultural constituencies that they served.
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